Paragraphs 16.4–16.6
Chapter XVI. Of Good Works
These Sections teach—
1st. That works of supererogation are so far from being possible, even for the most eminent saint, that in this life it is not possible for the most thoroughly sanctified one fully to discharge all his positive obligations.
2d. That, for several reasons assigned, the best works of believers, so far from meriting either the pardon of sin or eternal life at the hands of God, cannot even endure the scrutiny of his holy judgment.
3d. That, nevertheless, the works of sincere believers are, like their persons, in spite of their imperfections, accepted because of their union with Christ Jesus, and rewarded for his sake.
1st. The phrase “supererogation” means “more than is demanded.” Works of supererogation are in their own nature impossible under the moral law of God. In man’s present state even the most eminent saint is incapable of fully discharging all his obligations—much more, of course, of surpassing them. The Romish Church teaches the ordinary Arminian theory of perfectionism. In addition to this error, they teach (a) that good works subsequent to baptism merit increase of grace and eternal felicity;1 and (b) they distinguish between the commands and counsels of Christ. The former are binding upon all classes of the people, and their observance necessary in order to salvation. The latter, consisting of advice, not of commands—such as celibacy, voluntary poverty, obedience to monastic rule, etc.—are binding only on those who voluntarily assume them, seeking a higher degree of perfection and a more exalted reward.
We have already, under Chapter xiii., seen that a state of sinless perfection is never attained by Christians in this life, and it of course follows that much less is it possible for any to do more than is commanded.
That works of supererogation are always and essentially impossible to all creatures in all worlds is also evident—(1.) From the very nature of the moral law. That which is right under any relation is intrinsically obligatory upon the moral agent standing in that relation. If it be moral it is obligatory. If it be not obligatory, it is not moral. If it is not moral, it is, of course, of no moral value or merit. If it is obligatory, it is not supererogatory. When men do what it is their duty to do they are to claim nothing for it. Luke xvii. 10. (2.) The doing of that which God has not made it men’s duty to do—all manner of will-worship and commandments of men—God declares is an abomination to him. Col. ii. 18–22; 1 Tim. iv. 3; Matt. xv. 9. (3.) Christ has given no “counsels,” as distinct from his commands. His absolute and universal command to love God with the whole soul, and our neighbour as ourselves, covers the whole ground of possible ability or opportunity on earth or in heaven. Matt. xxii. 37–40. (4.) Increase of grace and eternal felicity, and all else which the believer needs or is capable of, is secured for him by the purchase of Christ’s blood, and either given freely now without price, or is reserved for him in that eternal inheritance which he is to receive as a joint heir with Christ. (5.) The working of the Romish system of celibacy, voluntary poverty and monastic vows, has produced such fruits that prove the principle on which they rest radically immoral and false.
2d. The best works of believers, instead of meriting pardon of sin and eternal life, cannot endure the scrutiny of his holy judgment. The reasons for this assertion are—(1.) As above shown, from the nature of the moral law. What is not obligatory is not moral, and what is not moral can have no moral desert. (2.) The best works possible for man are infinitely unworthy to be compared in value with God’s favour, and the rewards which men who trust to works seek to obtain through them. (3.) God’s infinite superiority to us, his absolute proprietorship in us as our Maker, and sovereignty over us as our moral Governor, necessarily excludes the possibility of our actions deserving any reward at his hand. No action of ours can profit God or lay him under obligation to us. All that is possible to us is already a debt we owe him as our Creator and Preserver. When we have done our utmost we are only unprofitable servants. Much less, then, can any possible obedience at one moment atone for any disobedience in another moment. (4.) As already proved under Chapter xiii., on Sanctification, our works, which could merit nothing even if perfect, are in this life, because of remaining imperfections, most imperfect. They therefore, the best of them, need to be atoned for by the blood, and presented through the mediation, of Christ, before they can find acceptance with the Father.
3d. Nevertheless, the good works of sincere believers are, like their persons, in spite of their imperfections, accepted, because of their union with Christ Jesus, and rewarded for his sake. All our approaches to God are made through Christ. It is only through him that we have access to the Father by the Spirit. Eph. ii. 18. “Whatever we do, in word or deed,” we are commanded to “do all in the name of the Lord Jesus.” Col. iii. 17.
As to the relation of good works to rewards, it may be observed—(1.) The word merit, in the strict sense of the term, means that common quality of all actions or services to which a reward is due in strict justice on account of their intrinsic value or worthiness. It is evident that, in this strict sense, no work of any creature can in itself merit any reward from God, because (a) all the faculties he possesses were originally granted and are continuously sustained by God, so that he is already so far in debt to God that he can never bring God in debt to him. (b.) Nothing the creature can do can be a just equivalent for the incomparable favour of God and its consequences.
There is another sense of the word, however, in which it may be affirmed that if Adam had in his original probation yielded the obedience required, he would have “merited” the reward conditioned upon it, not because of the intrinsic value of that obedience, but because of the terms of the covenant which God had graciously condescended to form with him. By nature, the creature owed the Creator obedience, while the Creator owed the creature nothing. But by covenant the Creator voluntarily bound himself to owe the creature eternal life, upon the condition of perfect obedience.
It is evident that in this life the works of God’s people can have no merit in either of the senses above noticed. They can have no merit intrinsically, because they are all imperfect, and therefore themselves worthy of punishment rather than of reward. They can have no merit by covenant concession on God’s part, because we are not now standing in God’s sight in the covenant of works, but of grace, and the righteousness of Christ, received by faith alone, constitutes the sole meritorious ground upon which our salvation, in all of its stages, rests. See Chapter xi., on Justification.
In the dispensation of the gospel, the gracious work of the believer and the gracious reward he receives from God are branches from the same gracious root. The same covenant of grace provides at once for the infusion of grace in the heart, the exercise of grace in the life and the reward of the grace so exercised. It is all of grace—a grace called a reward added to a grace called a work. The one grace is set opposite to the other grace as a reward, for these reasons: (a.) To act upon us as a suitable stimulus to duty. God promises to reward the Christian just as a father promises to reward his child for doing what is its duty, and what is for its own benefit alone. (b.) Because a certain gracious proportion has been established between the grace given in the reward and the grace given in the holy exercises of the heart and life, but both are alike given for Christ’s sake. This proportion has been established—the more grace of obedience, the more grace of reward; the more grace on earth, the more glory in heaven—because God so wills it, and because the grace given and exercised in obedience prepares the soul for the reception of the further grace given in the reward. Matt. xvi. 27; 1 Cor. iii. 8; 2 Cor. iv. 17.
1 Council of Trent, Sess. vi., ch. xvi., Canon 24, 32.