Paragraphs 7.1–7.2
Chapter VII. Of God’s Covenant with Man
These Sections teach the following propositions:
1st. The duty which an intelligent creature owes its Creator is essential and inalienable from its being.
2d. The enjoyment of the Creator’s fulness and love by the creature, however, is a matter of free and sovereign grace, depending solely on the will of the Creator.
3d. In the case of men and angels, God has been pleased to promise this transcendent benefit upon certain conditions, which conditional promise is called a covenant.
4th. In the first covenant that concerned mankind, God dealt with Adam as the representative of all his descendants.
5th. The promise of this covenant was life; the condition of it perfect and personal obedience.
1st. The duty which an intelligent creature owes to its Creator is inalienable, and springs necessarily (1) from the absolute imperative obligation which is of the essence of all that is morally right—which exercises authority over the will, but does not receive authority from it; and (2) from the relation of dependence and obligation involved in the very fact of being created. To be a created, intelligent, moral agent is to be under all the obligation of obeying the will and of living for the glory of the absolute Owner and Governor.
2d. That, on the other hand, the enjoyment of the Creator’s fulness and love by the creature is a matter of sovereign grace, depending alone upon the will of the Creator, is also self-evident. The very act of creation brings the creature under obligation to the Creator, but it cannot bring the Creator into obligation to the creature. Creation itself, being a signal act of grace, cannot endow the beneficiary with a claim for more grace. If God, for instance, has created a man with an eye, it may be eminently consistent with the divine attributes, and a ground of fair anticipation, that at some time he who has given eyes will also give light; but, surely, the creation of the first can lay the foundation of no right upon the part of man for the gift of the second. And, of course, far less can the fact that in creation God endowed men with a religious nature lay the foundation of any right on their part for the infinitely more precious gift of the personal communications of his own ineffable love and grace. God cannot be bound to take all creatures naturally capable of it into the intimacies of his own society. If he does so, it is a matter of infinite condescension and sovereign will.
3d. In the case of men and angels, God has been pleased to promise this transcendent benefit upon certain conditions, which conditional promise is called a covenant. There can be no doubt that this amazing gift of God’s personal love and life-giving society had been offered to angels, and at the beginning was offered to the first human pair, upon conditions. Some object that the conditional promise made to Adam in the garden is not explicitly called a covenant, and that it does not possess all the essential elements of a covenant, since it was a constitution sovereignly ordained by the Creator without consulting the will of the creature. It is a sufficient answer to these objections (1) that although Adam’s will was not consulted, yet his will was unquestionably cordially consenting to this divine constitution and all the terms thereof, and hence the transaction did embrace all the elements of a covenant. (2.) That several instances of analogous transactions between God and men are expressly styled covenants in the Bible. If God’s transactions with Noah (Gen. ix. 11, 12) and with Abraham (Gen. xvii. 1–21) were covenants, then was his transaction with Adam in the garden a covenant.
The analysis of a covenant always gives the following elements: (a.) Its parties. (b.) Its promise. (c.) Its conditions. (d.) Its penalty. As to its parties, our standards teach—
4th. In the first covenant that concerned mankind, God dealt with Adam as the representative of all his descendants. The parties, therefore, are God and Adam, the latter representing the human race. That Adam did so act as the representative of his descendants, in such a sense that they were equally interested with himself in all the merit or demerit, the reward or the penalty, attaching to his action during the period of probation, has already been proved to be the doctrine both of our standards and of Scripture (Chapter vi., §§ 3, 4). As to the further nature of this covenant, our standards teach—
5th. The promise of it was life, the condition of it perfect obedience, and the penalty of it death. L. Cat., Q. 20; S. Cat., Q. 12.
This covenant is variously styled, from one or other of these several elements. Thus, it is called the “covenant of works,” because perfect obedience was its condition, and to distinguish it from the covenant of grace, which rests our salvation on a different basis altogether. It is also called the “covenant of life,” because life was promised on condition of the obedience. It is also called a “legal covenant,” because it demanded the literal fulfilment of the claims of the moral law as the condition of God’s favour. This covenant was also in its essence a covenant of grace, in that it graciously promised life in the society of God as the freely-granted reward of an obedience already unconditionally due. Nevertheless it was a covenant of works and of law with respect to its demands and conditions.
(1.) That the promise of the covenant was life is proved—(a.) From the nature of the penalty, which is recorded in terms. If disobedience was linked to death, obedience must have been linked to life. (b.) It is taught expressly in many passages of Scripture. Paul says, Rom. x. 5: “Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, that he which doeth these things shall live by them.” Matt. xix. 16, 17; Gal. iii. 12; Lev. xviii. 5; Neh. ix. 29.
That the life promised was not mere continuance of existence is plain—(a.) From the fact that the death threatened was not the mere extinction of existence. Adam experienced that death the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The death threatened was exclusion from the communion of God. The life promised, therefore, must consist in the divine fellowship and the excellence and happiness thence resulting. (b.) From the fact that mere existence was not in jeopardy. It is the character, not the fact, of continued existence which God suspended upon obedience. (c.) Because the terms life and death are used in the Scriptures constantly to define two opposite spiritual conditions, which depend upon the relation of the soul to God. John v. 24; vi. 47; Rom. vi. 13; xi. 15; Eph. ii. 1–3; v. 14; Rev. iii. 1.
(2.) That the condition of the covenant was perfect obedience is plain from the fact (a) that the divine law can demand no less. It is of the essence of all that is right that it is obligatory. James says, that “whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, is guilty of all.” James ii. 10; Gal. iii. 10; Deut. xxvii. 26. (b.) That the command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, relating to a thing indifferent in itself, was plainly designed to be a naked test of obedience, absolute and without limit.
(3.) That the penalty of this covenant was death is distinctly stated. “In the day thou eatest thereof, dying thou shalt die.” Gen. ii. 17. This denoted a most lamentable state of existence, physical and moral, and not the cessation of existence or the dissolution of the union between soul and body, because (a) it took effect in our first parents hundreds of years before the dissolution of that union. (b.) Because the Scriptures constantly describe the moral and spiritual condition into which their descendants are born, and from which they are delivered by Christ, as a state of death. Rev. iii. 1; Eph. ii. 1–5; v. 14; John v. 24.
This death is a condition of increasing sin and misery, resulting from excision from the only source of life. It involves the entire person, soul and body, and continues as long as the cause continues.