A Commentary on the Confession of Faith (1869), Archibald Alexander Hodge · PDF

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Chapter IX. Of Free Will

This Section teaches the great fundamental truth of consciousness and revelation, which renders moral government possible; that man, in virtue of his creation, is endowed with an inalienable faculty of self-determination, the power of acting or not acting, and of acting in the way which the man himself, upon the whole view of the case, desires at the time. There are only three generically different views upon this subject possible:

1st. That which regards the actions of men as caused directly by outward circumstances and occasions, under the same great law of necessity which governs the movements of all material agents.

2d. That affected by the Arminians and others, which regards the will in man, or his bare faculty of volition, as possessing a mysterious capacity of self-determination, irrespective of all the judgments of the understanding and the affections of the heart and the entire state of the man’s soul at the time.

3d. That which is taught in this Section—namely, that the human soul, including all its instincts, ideas, judgments, affections and tendencies, has the power of self-decision; that is, the soul decides in every case as, upon the whole, it pleases.

That the first-stated view is not true is proved—(1.) From the universal consciousness of men with respect to their own action, and observation of the action of other men. We are all conscious of possessing the power of determining our own action irrespective of any or of all external influences. In every case of deliberate choice we are conscious that we might have chosen the opposite if we had wished to do so, all outward circumstances remaining unchanged. We see that all material substances act only as they are acted upon, and in the same conditions invariably act in the same way. But, on the other hand, we see that our fellow-men, like ourselves, possess, without exception, the power of originating action, and that, if they please, they act very variously under the same circumstances. Circumstances, including the sum total of conditions and relations, control the action of all material agents, while personal agents control circumstances. (2.) The same is proved by the fact that man is held responsible alike by his own conscience and by God for his own action. This evidently could not be the case if his action was caused by circumstances, and not freely by the man himself.

That the second view, which supposes that a man possesses the power to choose without respect to his judgments or inclinations, is not true; and that the third view, which supposes that a man possesses the inalienable faculty of choosing as upon the whole he judges right or desirable, is true, are proved—

(1.) From the consideration that while we are conscious in every deliberate act of choice that we might have chosen otherwise, all the external conditions being the same, we always feel that our choice was determined by the sum-total of our views, feelings and tendencies at the time. A man freely chooses what he wants to choose. He would not choose freely if he chose in any other way. But his desire in the premises is determined by his whole intellectual and emotional state at the time.

(2.) It is plain that if the human will decided in any given case in opposition to all the views of the reason and all the desires of the heart, however free the will might be, the man would be a most pitiful slave to a mere irrational and immoral power of willing.

(3.) All men judge that the rational and moral character of any act results from the purpose or desire, the internal state of mind or heart, which prompted the act. If the man wills in any given case in opposition to all his judgments and to all his inclinations of every kind, his act in that case would obviously be neither rational nor moral, and the man himself, in respect to that act, would be neither free nor responsible.

(4.) If the human soul had the power to act thus irrespective of its entire interior intellectual and emotional condition at the time, such action could neither be foreseen nor controlled by God, nor influenced by men, and such exercise of volitional power would be absolutely fortuitous. It would sustain no certain relation to the character of the agent. Christ taught, in opposition to this, that human action is determined by the character of the agent as certainly as the nature of the fruit is determined by the nature of the tree from which it springs; and that the only way to change the character of the action is to change the permanent character or moral tendency and habit of the heart of the agent. Matt. vii. 16–20; xii. 33–35.